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Assessing the Third Transition in Latin American 
Democratization 
Representational Regimes and Civil Society in Argentina and 
Brazil 
Elisabeth Jay Friedman and Kathryn Hochstetler 
In the last two decades most Latin American countries have made the political transition 
to formal liberal democracy. With a few notable exceptions, the threat of authoritarian 
reversals has diminished. But although democratic stability does not seem to be immi- 
nently imperiled, the quality of the democracies in the region often seems quite low. 
Instead of consolidated democracies, observers have found "hybrid" or "delegative" 
regimes, run on the principles of"neopopulism" and "neopluralism."I In order to ensure 
another transition, the economic transition from state-led to market-driven economies, 
presidents are ignoring legislative and judicial branches, their own parties, and many 
interest groups. As a result of these developments, analysts are increasingly using the 
institutionalization of political interaction as the litmus test of democratic consolidation. 
This article continues this concern with the quality of democracy and the institu- 
tionalization of political interactions but turns from issues of decision making to the- 
orize about developments in the arena of representation, particularly civil society. 
Under pressure from the economic transition, traditional institutions of representa- 
tion, including corporatist unions and political parties, seem to be in transformation, 
if not decay.2 As these institutions lose their legitimacy, there is a search for others, 
such as social movements, nongovernmental organizations, and "associative net- 
works," to replace or augment them.3 Indeed, analysts claim that an "institutionalized 
civil society" is an arena in which to assess the institutionalization and consolidation 
of regional democracies.4 The ongoing transformation of civil society is a potential 
third transition in Latin America and other transitional regions, as important as the 
often concurrent and mutually constitutive political move from military to civilian 
rule and the economic turn to market-oriented economies. 
This analysis departs from the classic definition of civil society as the realm of asso- 
ciative life separate from the family, the state, and the market.5 Civil society is instanti- 
ated by actors like social movements, interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, 
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and other noneconomic, nonstate actors who are quite diverse in their modes of organi- 
zation and their goals. As a group, they can be called civil society organizations. 
Defining the subject in this way allows more systematic investigation of the nature of 
their relations with state-based actors and political society, especially important in 
assessing the quality of democratization, and with economic actors like business associ- 
ations and unions. To examine how developments in the civil society arena are linked to 
processes of democratization and economic liberalization, the conceptual territory of 
democratic representational regimes will first be defined and mapped out. A compara- 
tive case study of civil society in Argentina and Brazil will then assess the consequences 
of different representational regimes for the quality of Latin American democracies. 
Representational Regimes 
Representation is important in any democratic regime because it relates the 
expressed preferences of the ruled with the choices and policies of the rulers. Civil 
society organizations, like parties and unions, help link citizens and leaders for the 
purpose of representation. The framework presented here could be used to assess the 
evolving nature of representation for the other linking actors as well, and a full 
understanding of current representational regimes in Argentina and Brazil would 
have to include such actors, although the characterization of the regime might be dif- 
ferent for them. Due to limitations of space, it will be applied initially to a compara- 
tively overlooked set of mediating actors, civil society organizations. 
All of the four representational regimes discussed here are compatible with the 
minimal or electoral form of democracy, so democracy is one part of their names (see 
Table 1). The need for qualifiers indicates that electoral mechanisms alone do not 
account for different kinds of representation, and these qualifiers in turn substantially 
alter the quality of the democracy in question. The four representational regimes are 
categorized along two axes, by their dominant actor and their degree of institutional- 
ization of civil society organizations' access to state actors. Representational mecha- 
nisms such as corporatism have long been classified by whether they are organized 
from the top down (within the state) or bottom up (within society). However, the 
Table 1 Four Representational Regimes 
Level of 
Institutionalization Low High 
Dominant Actor 
Society Adversarial democracy Deliberative democracy 
State Delegative democracy Cooptive democracy 
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study of democratizing countries brings another consideration to the fore: the degree 
of institutionalization. Institutionalized mechanisms of representation reduce the lev- 
els of uncertainty and arbitrariness for potential participants. 
Adversarial democracy is a representational regime that, while organized by soci- 
etal actors from the bottom up, has relatively low levels of institutionalization.6 
Citizens are not controlled by state actors, but neither are they assured a regular 
channel of access to political decision making. In addition, the state does not protect 
weaker civil society actors against stronger ones. For example, representation 
through clientelistic networks depends largely on citizens' trade of political support 
for favors from highly placed elites, who are not institutionally bound to represent 
them. Both pluralism and neopluralism are placed in this category.7 
While there are dangers associated with a lack of institutionalization when soci- 
ety is in charge, even less representation is ensured when low institutionalization is 
coupled with state control of state-society relations. Delegative democracy is a 
democracy in which state actors are selected democratically but run roughshod over 
other political institutions.8 Of particular concern is executives' ability largely to 
ignore representative organizations, from interest groups to parties to the legislative 
branch itself. Only the interests of the people as perceived by top state actors are 
taken into account, often with only plebiscitary or even no consultation. Examples of 
delegative democracy include populist types of authority relations where mobiliza- 
tion from the top down is largely intended to support a leader and does not depend 
on institutional or autonomous forms of representation.9 
High levels of state control coupled with high levels of institutionalized participa- 
tion produce cooptive democracy. Citizens have access to government elites, but in 
ways established and maintained by those elites. Far from ignoring civil society, state 
actors seek to coopt or repress autonomous civil organization. Civil society actors 
may approach the state, but only by obeying its participatory rules. This representa- 
tional regime shows clearly that even inclusive institutionalization in and of itself 
does not enhance the quality of democracy. In Latin America the classic example of 
such a cooptive democracy is state corporatism, where control and initiative over 
corporatist arrangements are exerted from the top down by the state.10 
Finally, in deliberative democracy, state actors facilitate social and political dia- 
logue that is broadly equitable and inclusive, that is regularly engaged in, and that 
carries weight in elite decision-making processes. Political theorists are currently 
delineating the preconditions and promise of such an approach.11 Their efforts par- 
tially fill the gap left by the paucity of historical experiences with deliberative 
democracy, especially in Latin America. Modes of representation such as societal 
corporatism, prominent in western Europe and distinguished from state corporatism 
by its greater impetus from societal actors, approximate some aspects of deliberative 
democracy but fall short of the theoretical ideals. 
How do these representational regimes condition civil society? An emerging con- 
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Table 2 Dimensions of Civil Society Organizations in Four Representational 
Regimes 
Representational Adversarial Delegative Cooptive Deliberative 
Regime democracy democracy democracy democracy 
Dimensions of 
CSOs 
Political Open; elite- Arbitrary; Regulated by state Open; regular and 
opportunity privileging dependent on or closed egalitarian access 
structures leader 
Mobilizing Varied; Included: weak Included: Varied; 
structures competitive institutionalization institutionalized cooperative 
Excluded: protest? Excluded: protest 
Frames Individualistic; Individualistic; Competing master Shared master 
issue-specific issue-specific frames: pro-state frames 
frames frames or anti-state and anti-state 
master frame 
sensus stresses the importance of three related factors in understanding the origin 
and development of social movements.12 Political opportunities (and constraints) 
emerge in the relations between civil society organizations and external political 
actors and institutions. Civil society organizations organize their own activities 
through mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures may range from friendship net- 
works to highly structured permanent organizations. Finally, civil society organiza- 
tions shape shared conceptions of problems and solutions and of their own identities 
through framing processes. Frames draw attention to the role of ideas and under- 
standings in social movement mobilizations. Master frames lie at a higher level of 
abstraction and allow related movements to see themselves as part of a common 
struggle. Table 2 summarizes the relationship of these three dimensions of civil soci- 
ety organizations to the four representational regimes. 
The political opportunity structure of adversarial democracy is characterized by a 
relative hands-off approach by state institutions and actors, who do not try to direct the 
number, type, and goals of civil society organizations. Interest mediation is more ad hoc 
than regularized. Thus, the political opportunities characterizing adversarial democracy 
will be more open to the influence of multiple civil society organizations, but may easi- 
ly privilege those representing elite interests. With respect to mobilizing structures, 
adversarial democracy will not lead to predictable organizational structures among civil 
society actors. They might in fact foster competition rather than cooperation among dif- 
ferent kinds of groups, given that there is a relatively open marketplace for the expres- 
sion of interests. Not surprisingly, the orientation of mobilizing structures will often be 
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geared to the organizations' ability to generate the funds, training, and access necessary 
to achieve a high profile and garner political access. Finally, the framing processes of 
adversarial democracy will be focused more on the common points of reference of a 
specific set of groups than on a multisectoral vision. Adversarial democracy does not 
present an incentive structure for groups to develop shared identities that will bind them 
into stable networks. Therefore, civil society organizations will be less able to achieve 
goals beyond influence on specific policy issues. 
In delegative democracy political opportunities will be arbitrary and will depend 
almost entirely on the actions of populist leaders. Individual relationships will be of 
considerable importance. Those ignored by political leaders will have little institu- 
tional recourse, whether political or judicial. The mobilizing structures under delega- 
tive democracy will differ for the sectors that leaders seek as supporters and those 
they exclude. Leaders may well direct resources toward supporters' organizations, 
though institutionalization will remain weak. The sectors that are excluded may seek 
alliances to protest their exclusion but will find organizational solutions. to their 
predicament difficult to coordinate. Finally, the framing processes of civil society 
organizations under delegative democracy will repeat the pattern under adversarial 
democracy: temporary formulation of understandings around particular issues. 
However, given the exclusion common to many sectors, protest against arbitrary 
government may become a common frame. 
In cooptive democracies the state will provide different kinds of access for differ- 
ent sectors of civil society, with participatory mechanisms established for some and 
repression for others. State actors will strongly control the scope and form of the 
access of even those civil society organizations that have direct access to decision 
making. These arrangements are generally institutionalized beyond the tenure of 
individual administrations. Cooptive democratic arrangements will favor different 
mobilizing structures for included and excluded civil society organizations. Special 
state resources and access for favored organizations will support relatively complex 
organizational structures, while the dependence on state resources orients the organi- 
zations to conventional opportunities for collective action. Among excluded groups, 
the rigidity and selective inclusion associated with cooptive democracy may spur 
new protest movements. Civil society organizations in cooptive democracy will 
develop shared frames stressing the central role of the state in framing collective 
problems and solutions. As in delegative democracy, excluded actors may also join 
together within a master frame in demanding broader participation, although their 
frames could also be fragmented and individualistic. 
Finally, in deliberative democracy the political opportunity structure will be both 
systematically open to civil society organizations and susceptible to their reformula- 
tion. The state will also mediate the interactions of different sectors of civil society 
to assure their equitable and uncoerced participation. Mobilizing structures will vary 
25 
This content downloaded from 138.202.1.112 on Wed, 01 Jul 2015 17:38:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Comparative Politics October 2002 
in deliberative democracy because many different kinds of participation will be 
assured through the open and equitable political opportunity structure. The voices of 
experts and less conventional kinds of political actors will be heard. Mobilizing 
structures will depend more on the preferences of the organizations themselves than 
on state-driven forms. Finally, framing processes are central to deliberative democra- 
cy. Continuous open dialogue that respects many kinds of participants will produce 
broader understandings of issues. Proponents of deliberative democracy argue that 
participants will be transformed through their dialogues and reoriented to thinking in 
collective rather than in individual terms. 
Research Design and Methodology 
The concept of representational regime will be applied through a structured, focused 
comparison of two Latin American countries that have recently undergone the three 
transitions: Brazil and Argentina. Under Vargas and Per6n, respectively, these two 
countries developed the representational regime of cooptive democracy known as 
state corporatism. In the 1960s their military governments heavily restricted democ- 
ratic representation. Now their representational regimes are again changing. To 
assess this change, the three factors identified above as central to the origin and 
development of contemporary civil society organizations-political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes-will be analyzed. 
The general approach of this article is historical institutionalism. In particular, it 
begins with the premise that institutions of interest representation structure the pref- 
erences and strategies of the actors within them. In addition, historical institutional- 
ism assumes a stickiness of institutional arrangements that helps set trajectories for 
future political choices and arrangements. Thus, the past experiences of interest rep- 
resentation in these two cases should have an impact on current representational 
regimes, although "political choices, strategies, and contingencies remain central 
determinants of social and economic processes, and their meaning and consequences 
perhaps gain even greater relevance in a conjuncture of deep economic crises and 
transformations."13 Although many institutional approaches do not give adequate 
attention to the central framing processes that help nonstate actors interpret and con- 
struct their alternative courses of action, they are considered important here. 
Brazil 
The Brazilian transition from military to civilian rule developed gradually and 
unevenly. Elections and parties were constrained throughout the military period. 
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Significant opposition victories began in 1974. Some elements of the transition are 
still incomplete, and the new democracy suffers from significant failings.14 The eco- 
nomic transition also proceeded in fits and starts. Comprehensive neoliberal reforms 
began only in 1994. Not surprisingly, civil society also shows signs of both progress 
and regression, although the degree of institutionalization of state-society relations is 
high in Brazil compared to both Argentina and other aspects of Brazilian politics. 
New political opportunities opened during the final years of the military regime. 
Politicians from the parties in opposition to the military were elected to subnational 
positions even before control of the national executive passed into civilian hands in 
1985. From their new positions they extended participatory invitations to their for- 
mer allies in civil society organizations. The Workers Party (PT) was especially com- 
mitted to creating popular councils where civil society organizations could directly 
join in policymaking and implementation, but other parties also joined in the 
effort.15 The 1988 national constitution and subsequent lower level constitutions 
required councils that included civil society organizations to orient policy in a vari- 
ety of issue areas. By the 1990s the proliferation of councils led to what Alvarez 
calls "council democracy" in Brazil.16 There are at least eighty-four national coun- 
cils, and thousands of lower level councils across the country.17 One estimate sug- 
gests that there are 1,167 councils on social issues operating in the state of Sao Paulo 
alone.18 These councils are difficult to characterize as a group. Some are made up of 
appointed members, which often limits participation. Others allow civil society orga- 
nizations to select their own representatives to the councils. On paper, many of the 
councils have significant decision-making and/or executive authority, which is 
shared unequally with their civil society participants. Civil society organizations 
have pushed to make the councils and their own roles within them more powerful 
and even share the leadership role with state actors in the councils-on children and 
adolescents (Conanda) and social assistance (CNAS).19 
Without doubt, Brazil's council democracy presents unusually extensive and insti- 
tutionalized opportunities for political participation. Less clear is whether these 
institutionalized opportunities are best understood as instances of cooptive democra- 
cy or as rare examples of deliberative democracy. Hoping they would be the latter, 
civil society organizations in many cases requested such councils. Nonetheless, 
councils are currently arenas of struggle over exactly this issue. The struggle is espe- 
cially intense in the social councils, where civil society organizations deliberately 
push an extensive agenda that runs directly counter to the neoliberal spending plans 
of the national executive. In this struggle state actors hold many advantages over 
civil society actors. They use their control over resources to punish and reward civil 
society organizations and simply try to ignore these fora if they will not rubber 
stamp the government's preferred policies.20 Civil society organizations have 
responded by trying to mobilize their bases and by capitalizing on the basic repre- 
sentational advance of the councils. Even if governments do not want to listen, the 
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councils are a new space for civil society organizations to speak publicly and to 
deliberate with each other. 
Other participatory opportunities have been more episodic. Large numbers of civil 
society organizations mobilized to influence the new federal constitution. Several 
large nongovernmental organizations set up operations in Brasilia during the delibera- 
tions, coordinating a far-flung network of civil society organizations called the 
Plenary for Popular Participation in the Constituent Assembly. The Plenary for 
Popular Participation lost several early battles over the format of the constituent 
assembly but gained the opportunity to present popular amendments to the constitu- 
tional drafts.21 Civil society organizations collected over six million signatures for 
amendments about economic inclusion and nearly five million for rights of various 
kinds.22 Some of these proposals were included in the constitution, while other cher- 
ished amendments, like agrarian reform, were not. A similar opportunity for influence 
and debate emerged just a few years later, when Brazil hosted the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Civil society orga- 
nizations again created a broad cross-sectoral coalition of over 1,200 organizations in 
the Forum of Brazilian Nongovernmental Organizations, which both developed their 
own civil society positions on the conference issues and tried to influence their gov- 
ernment's positions. The Forum held eight national "encounters" to plan their partici- 
pation before hosting a global nongovernmental forum parallel to the governmental 
summit.23 Some of the same large organizations that helped to coordinate the Plenary 
for Popular Participation also sat on the national coordinating committee of the 
Forum and created an ongoing umbrella organization of nongovernmental organiza- 
tions called the Brazilian Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (Abong) in 
1991.24 The constituent assembly and UNCED mobilizations were most similar to 
adversarial or even deliberative forums of interest representation; civil society organi- 
zations charted much of their own course for their participation. 
During the first decade of civilian politics in Brazil opportunities for civil society 
organizations were scattered across the numerous councils and the occasional larger 
mobilizing opportunities. Government attention was focused primarily on the contin- 
uing economic crisis, and no national administration attempted to think more broad- 
ly about the emerging civil society organizations and their political role. Despite a 
series of economic shock packages, staggering inflation rates of nearly 2,500 percent 
in 1993 persisted alongside sluggish growth (-0.7 percent for 1981-1990 and 1.2 
percent for 1991-1996), lower real wages from 1990 to 1995, and continuing unem- 
ployment.25 Excluded from economic decision making and alarmed at rising levels 
of violence, a broad array of civil society organizations took to the streets in protest 
against increasing poverty and hunger. Ironically, an important new opportunity 
emerged for civil society organizations only after Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as 
finance minister, tamed inflation with Brazil's fullest neoliberal reforms in 1994, 
without addressing any of their other concerns. 
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Brazil's nongovernmental organizations have received major funding from inter- 
national sources; $400 million went annually to 5,500 Brazilian nongovernmental 
organizations in the mid 1990s. As Cardoso's new antiinflation policies succeeded, 
the dollar's value dropped sharply, and 86 percent of nongovernmental organizations 
had to cut employees and programs.26 After Cardoso was elected president, Abong 
met with his transition team to discuss both short-term assistance and possible 
longer-term partnerships between nongovernmental organizations and the federal 
government.27 Cardoso's team decided that the appropriate place for such ongoing 
discussions would be in a new agency within the executive branch called the 
Solidary Community (CS). The CS was in some ways the institutional successor of 
the previous president's National Council on Food Security. It was led by the first 
lady, Ruth Cardoso, as is typical of Latin American social programs, and is partly 
oriented toward the alleviation of poverty. 
However, most Latin American first ladies are not anthropology professors and 
long-term scholars of social movements, as Ruth Cardoso is.28 Her influence is most 
notable in the Council of the Solidary Community (CCS). The CCS took nearly 
eighteen months to settle on a mission, while civil society organizations, including 
Abong, heavily criticized the CS as a clientelistic effort to distract attention from the 
ways Cardoso's administration was gutting social programs.29 The CCS eventually 
defined a three part mission: strengthening civil society, forming new social devel- 
opment partnerships between the state and civil society, and maintaining systematic 
high-level dialogue between governmental and nongovernmental actors on social 
issues.30 A major mechanism was a series of discussions that tried to make concrete 
consensual proposals among invited governmental and nongovernmental partici- 
pants. Eight of these political interlocutions (interlocupdes politicas) have covered 
topics ranging from agrarian reform to integrated local development.31 The CCS 
itself can be considered a major new opportunity for civil society organizations to 
participate in a deliberative problem-solving forum. Its defenders see it as wholly 
innovative and positive. They insist that the CCS is truly a space somewhere between 
the governmental and nongovernmental, that its "publicization" of problem solving 
is a necessary counterpart to neoliberal privatization, and that it breaks with all old 
conceptions of representation by inviting individual participants who do not repre- 
sent their organizations, their sectors, or their governmental agencies but instead rep- 
resent important ideas.32 Few outside the CCS itself are prepared to grant it all these 
claims, but civil society organizations have been willing to engage in the political 
interlocutions with varying concrete results. 
One recent result is a law that addresses some of the concerns of Abong and other 
civil society organizations about reshaping relations between them and the state. 
This law was largely drafted in a CCS interlocution process in 1997 and 1998, with 
about $8 million in funding from the Inter-American Development Bank for early 
stages of the debates and the participation of various civil society actors.33 The fed- 
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eral executive presented the law to the congress in July 1998, which passed it in 
March 1999. The law updates the previous legislation from the 1950s by creating a 
new legal category, the Civil Society Organization of Public Interest (OSCIP), and a 
new mechanism for funding such agencies, the partnership (parceria). Despite its 
lengthy and deliberative genesis, the law has been largely stillborn. A year after pas- 
sage, while 192 organizations (a tiny fraction of those eligible) had applied for 
OSCIP status, only eighteen were approved.34 The ministry of justice found statutory 
irregularities in most of the rejected organizations, partly because some clauses in 
the new legislation were inconsistent with the tax code.35 In addition, no partner- 
ships have been established, confirming the skepticism of civil society organizations 
about forthcoming resources. Federal economic agencies, in fact, resisted the cre- 
ation of tax deductions for contributions to OSCIPs, despite the civil society organi- 
zations' requests, and consistently refused to guarantee funding for partnerships.36 
The Brazilian nonprofit sector received about 15.5 percent of its funding from the 
public sector in 1995, well below the global average of 40.1 percent.37 In light of 
these problems, the small number of OSCIPs is not surprising. 
Some opportunities consistent with adversarial democracy exist with respect to 
the national congress. Formally, there are few restrictions on lobbying and attempts 
to influence congress. Nonetheless, the weakness of both the party system and the 
congress itself have made them a secondary arena for most civil society organiza- 
tions.38 The congress has been especially weak in economic policymaking. 
Executives have made economic policy largely without it. 
Finally, diverse international actors have both provided new opportunities for civil 
society organizations and channeled their activities in particular ways. The most 
direct impacts have come from the funding that international actors have given to 
Brazilian civil society organizations; 170 different international institutions provided 
83 percent of the total funding to Abong's member associations in 1993.39 Other 
impacts are less direct. They include the reorganization and renaming of recipient 
organizations as nongovernmental organizations rather than other kinds of social 
organizations40 and the adoption of new substantive discourses, as in the turn by 
indigenous and rubbertapper associations in the Amazon to an environmental dis- 
course in the 1980s.41 International actors have also been an important support for 
many Brazilian civil society organization campaigns and mobilizations, on topics 
ranging from the Amazon to human rights to street children. 
Nongovernmental organizations have become an important mobilizing structure for 
civil society organizations since 1985. A leading Brazilian scholar (and employee) of 
nongovernmental organizations, Leilah Landim, characterizes them as "a group of the 
most modern and recent organizations in our history, professionalized and secular, 
where world-views and activities go in the direction of promoting citizenship, equality, 
and democracy."42 Many definitions of nongovernmental organizations stress only their 
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professional and organizational qualities. In contrast to social movements, they are less 
spontaneous and tend to more conventional and apolitical kinds of participation, based 
on special skills and expertise. Brazilian nongovernmental organizations, however, tend 
to be more engaged with frankly political and unconventional organizations and to par- 
ticipate more in protest mobilizations than their counterparts in other countries such as 
Argentina. In Brazil the same broad and diverse coalition that mobilized to lobby pro- 
fessionally at the constituent assembly and the UNCED conference also organized a 
million people to march for the impeachment of president Collor in 1993 and then 
launched a large campaign against hunger and violence.43 
More traditional social movements also continue in large numbers as part of the 
mobilizing structure. They have lost some visibility with the rise of nongovernmen- 
tal organizations but, as Sonia Alvarez notes, they are always there for an observer 
who knows where to look for them and are as active as ever, with smaller demonstra- 
tions, numerous gatherings, and clear positions on the issues of the day.44 Because of 
their precarious organizational structure, they often can not move quickly and 
expertly enough to compete with nongovernmental organizations for state-defined 
opportunities. But they have been a critical part of the civil society organization net- 
works in Brazil since the 1970s, swelling the numbers for protests and lobbying, 
contributing ideas, and pursuing their self-defined ends. A few social movements, 
notably the Landless Movement (MST), have played even more visible roles, protest- 
ing ongoing inequality in land ownership and the neoliberal state's economic agenda. 
For Brazilian civil society organizations, the mobilizing frame since 1985 has 
been citizenship.45 This master frame goes well beyond the political meaning of citi- 
zenship to social and economic inclusion as central indicators of its presence. 
Citizenship, as used by Brazilian civil society organizations, is a social justice rights 
claim. Civil society organizations claim citizenship for themselves, and they use 
their access to the political system to push for citizenship for groups that continue to 
be excluded. This frame has proven to be remarkably adaptable, motivating all of the 
mobilizations discussed above. First articulated during the constituent assembly 
mobilizations which marked the political transition, this conception of citizenship 
was equally appropriate for civil society's responses to the second, economic transi- 
tion.46 The antihunger campaigns of 1993 and 1994 called themselves Action of 
Citizenship against Hunger, Misery and for Life. The frame has also helped establish 
links to a part of the business community that is committed to both economic pros- 
perity and social justice. The citizenship frame is obviously both broad and com- 
pelling enough to sustain national links within civil society over quite long periods 
of time. As the concept is defined in Brazil, it also necessarily links all three sectors: 
state, economy, and civil society. It is a deliberative democracy frame that can not 
easily be turned to supporting state control over representation, since its emphasis is 
on equitable participation and inclusion. 
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Argentina 
The Argentine transition to democracy happened much faster than the Brazilian. The 
authoritarian "dirty war" (1976-1983), in which tens of thousands of Argentines 
were killed or disappeared, ended after the external shock of Argentine military 
defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas war galvanized the opposition in the early 1980s.47 
The October 1983 elections heralded the end of the military dictatorship. A turnover 
in power from one civilian government to another took place in the second national 
election in 1989, though somewhat ahead of schedule. Radical Party leader Rauil 
Alfonsin resigned six months before the end of his term because of his failure to 
curb hyperinflation.48 In response, Peronist Carlos Menem began neoliberal econom- 
ic reform upon taking office. Although there was a time lag between the political 
and economic transitions, the third transition of civil society had a rocky start before 
the neoliberal transformation and has been deeply affected by it. The degree of insti- 
tutionalization of state-society relations today, while evolving, is relatively low. 
Social movement activity, particularly of the human rights groups that spearhead- 
ed the opposition to authoritarianism, marked the political transition of the 1980s. 
Whereas the rejected Peronist presidential candidate had ties to the military, the win- 
ning Radical candidate, Alfonsin, explicitly affirmed human rights and rejected the 
military's attempt to declare a self-amnesty.49 In a weighty symbolic move, he adopt- 
ed the slogan "we are life" from the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the most famous 
of the human rights groups that fought against the military regime.50 Thus, the tran- 
sition was guided by a human rights frame developed by the most symbolically pow- 
erful element of the opposition. 
Human rights organizations pressed the new democratic regime to address its 
central claims for the rule of law and justice.51 A civilian commission was estab- 
lished to look into human rights violations. Eventually, nine members of the military 
junta were tried; five were found guilty; and two were imprisoned for life. All others 
were absolved through military trials. Despite enormous protests, the government 
passed the final stop and due obedience laws to restrict trials to only the highest- 
ranking officers by mid 1987.52 The threat of military rebellion continued to affect 
the opportunities extended to the human rights movement. National and international 
protests notwithstanding, Menem issued a general pardon in 1990. 
The impact of a political opportunity structure increasingly closed to the demands 
of the human rights movement was destructive. Failing to achieve its central goals, 
the movement split over whether to work in or outside of the system.53 The mothers 
themselves divided, particularly over the issue of identifying cadavers and abducted 
grandchildren.54 The organizational strength of other civil society organizations was 
sapped by the growing economic crisis.55 Participation in civil society organizations 
declined from 35 to 19 percent of the adult population between 1984 and 1991.56 
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The economic transition heralded a new phase in civil society organizing. The 
economic reforms started in 1989 and crystallized in the convertibility plan of 1991 
were focused on definitively opening the internal market to private investment and 
promoting exports.57 They called for reduction in state support for economic devel- 
opment and social welfare. Supportive political reforms, granting the president more 
decree power and promoting decentralization, were also included. Although reducing 
state involvement in economic (and political) life could be seen as providing oppor- 
tunities consistent with adversarial democracy, executive power and decentralization 
have often produced delegative results, even after Menem's decretismo gave way to 
Radical president Fernando de la Rua's more conciliatory attitude.58 In particular, 
relations between civil society organizations and the state seem to depend more on 
the whims of administrations than on institutionalized frameworks. However, the 
response of the judiciary to the demands of civil society organizations, particularly 
in recent human rights cases, shows that some degree of institutionalized delibera- 
tion may be evolving. Such opportunities can be seen in several examples. 
A subsecretariat for human rights, part of the ministry of the interior, was created 
in 1984. It has collaborated productively with particular human rights groups.59 But 
under Menem's watch it switched from the investigation of specific violations to the 
promotion of rights education. This more hands-off approach was reinforced by 
decentralized (provincial) state contact with civil society organizations. 
Menem also created the National Women's Council (CNM), upgrading the previ- 
ous national women's agency, in 1992. Its mandate is to oversee the national fulfill- 
ment of the U.N. Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and to promote public policy to ensure gender equality. However, during 
Menem's administration the CNM had strained relations with feminist civil society 
organizations, particularly due to the CNM's support for the Catholic church's posi- 
tion on reproductive rights. Some nongovernmental organizations claimed that the 
CNM channeled grant monies from international institutions only to government 
supporters.60 With the change of administration to de la Rua, the CNM was almost 
closed. After supporters lobbied hard, it was reinstated, though with a shrunken bud- 
get from overall administrative reductions. New leaders prioritized links with civil 
society organizations. 
In 1995 an executive branch office was established to mediate between civil soci- 
ety organizations and the state. The National Center for Community Organizations 
(CENOC) began as part of the Presidency's Secretariat for Social Development. Its 
purpose is to help civil society organizations play a greater role in the development 
of social policy. Its methods include the articulation of links among the state, civil 
society, and the market and the promotion of civil society organization networking 
and development. One of its central tasks is to keep a data base of organizations. 
Although it helps civil society organizations connect with funders, the former direc- 
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tor of CENOC made clear that it deliberately avoided compulsory registration or dis- 
tribution of state monies to avoid the possibility of clientelism.61 With the change of 
administration, CENOC's budget was cut, and a new director without a civil society 
background was appointed. As a result of the confusion in CENOC's shifting man- 
date, the provincial network of nongovernmental organizations felt cut off from the 
capital.62 
Although in a similar institutional position, CENOC differs from the Brazilian 
CS in two crucial ways. First, it was established not through negotiations with civil 
society organizations, but at the suggestion of the wife of the then head of the 
Secretariat for Social Development. Its uncertain fate may be due to the top-down 
nature of its creation. Second, it has not made state-civil society dialogues a key part 
of its program. It has served more as an information conduit for civil society organi- 
zations. 
Another opportunity on the legislative end was the Subcommission on 
Nongovernmental Organizations, subsequently integrated into the lower chamber's 
Commission of Mutual Societies, Cooperatives, and Nongovernmental 
Organizations. It was started in 1998 by Peronist deputy Mario Cafiero, due again 
not to civil society pressure but to his recognition of the growth of the civil society 
organization sector in the 1990s.63 The subcommission first proposed legislation to 
regulate nongovernmental organizations that wished to use public funds, including 
those distributed from international financial institutions, voluntary labor, and non- 
profit tax liabilities and benefits. In countrywide meetings it found that, while many 
civil society organizations were anxious for legal status, some challenged state regu- 
lation of voluntary service or access to funding. 
This legislation faced intense competition with other proposed laws on civil soci- 
ety organizations in the congress, including one project supported by the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and other proposals by the 
major parties. Clearly, there is rising interest among legislators in "representing" 
civil society. However, a legal consultant who has evaluated both the Brazilian and 
the Argentine legislation on civil society organizations considers the Argentine both 
comparatively modest and more controlling than the Brazilian.64 At the end of 2000 
only the legislation on volunteers was seriously under consideration, and it manifest- 
ed a disposition for state control.65 
In adjudicating a legal action brought by the rights group CELS (see below), a 
federal judge in March 2001 struck down the final stop and due obedience laws as 
unconstitutional because they violated international human rights treaties that 
Argentina had signed.66 Along with the successful judicial prosecution of members 
of the military who trafficked in the adoption of infants of the disappeared, this rul- 
ing indicates the potential for more responsive relations between the judiciary and 
civil society. 
There is also an international aspect to the political opportunity structure: support 
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from international financial institutions and international civil society organizations. 
Both the World Bank and the IDB are heavily involved in funding projects around 
second generation reforms, including market-completing measures, distribution 
issues such as the alleviation of poverty, and governability issues.67 They have made 
civil society organizations, seen as more efficient service providers than the state, a 
key player. The president of the Social Sector Forum, an organization of larger non- 
governmental organizations, credited these international financial institutions with 
forcing the state to engage in dialogue with nongovernmental organizations; the 
Forum itself participated in a civil society organization assessment project cospon- 
sored by the U.N. Development Programme, the World Bank, and the IDB.68 This 
form of participation has resulted from "the massive demands of 'northern' civil 
society organizations" as well as international financial institutions' search for effec- 
tive development.69 From academic exchanges, such as the participation of CEDES, 
a prominent Argentine thinktank, in a comparative Johns Hopkins University study 
of the third sector, to international human rights organizations' historical support for 
domestic actors, such international involvement must be taken into account in under- 
standing national civil society organizing. But not all international opportunities 
have similar impacts. The channeling of international funds through the state allows 
for continued state control over civil society. The public share of funding for 
Argentine nonprofits was 19.5 percent of their total funding in 1995, slightly above 
Brazil's ratio but half the global average.70 Much of it is required matching funds for 
international contributions and mandatory social welfare payments.71 
The mobilizing structures of civil society organizations, particularly in the capital, 
Buenos Aires, present competing projects. While this competition seems to be compati- 
ble with adversarial democracy, continuing clientelistic practices between state agencies 
and certain nongovernmental organizations, as well as a significant protest sector, also 
support delegative democracy.72 It is also supported by particularistic and protest-based 
issue framing. However, some civil society organizations are trying to organize more 
deliberatively. Drawing on the concepts legitimized by human rights groups under dicta- 
torship, many groups use a rights-based frame for their demands.73 
Human rights groups seek to establish a politics of accountability by drawing 
attention to and prosecuting past and present violations. The Center for Legal and 
Social Studies (CELS) focuses on the legal aspects of human rights documentation 
and defense and won the case against impunity in March. The latest generation of 
family groups is H.I.J.O.S. ("children"), formed by the children of the disappeared. 
This group holds public "outings" (escraches) of human rights abusers, targeting 
those as prominent as the president's brother-in-law.74 Other family organizations 
include Active Memory, started by the family members of the victims of the yet 
unresolved 1994 bombing of the AMIA, a prominent Jewish center in Buenos Aires, 
and the Commission of the Family Members of the Defenseless Victims of Social 
Violence, formed in response to police brutality and repression. 
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Spontaneous protest in the last decade has been directed against the severe impact 
of neoliberal economic restructuring on the population.75 The economy is in reces- 
sion. External debt has more than doubled in the past ten years, and exports have 
been cut in half.76 From 2000 to 2001 alone unemployment increased from 15.4 to 
16 percent; 18 percent of the country in 2001 was living below the poverty line.77 
The economic crisis has sparked puebladas, in which a whole city (pueblo) erupts in 
protest, including the takeover and burning of public buildings and blockading of 
major roads.78 Unemployed piqueteros have coordinated nationwide roadblocks and 
with the support of leftist parties and certain unions joined in general strikes under 
the uniting frame of opposition to state austerity measures.79 
The nongovernmental organization sector in urban development and social services 
has expanded to make up for state downsizing.80 This sector has spawned organizations 
promoting state-market-civil society linkage. For example, the umbrella Social Sector 
Forum was established in 1996 to represent the so-called third sector (volunteer, charity, 
and nonprofit organizations). The Forum seeks third sector participation in public policy 
formation and involvement in the distribution of multilateral loans.81 Conscience 
Association, a citizen education group started by the president of the Forum, also has 
connections to government officials, church leaders, and business.82 
This trend towards the privatization of civil society is affirmed by the business 
sponsorship sought by particular groups. For example, the Fifth Argentine 
Conference of the Social Sector (June 26, 1999), underwritten by various businesses, 
was focused on "assuring the future of our organizations." Some conference training 
was oriented at helping organizations make strategic links with businesses as well as 
foundations and government. Domingo Cavallo, the finance minister, was a closing 
speaker. He advocated a civil society free from state regulation, comparable to the 
free market. However, as faith in the free market declines with the growing econom- 
ic crisis, interest in "private" collaboration may also be waning. 
Other mobilizing structures, sometimes with reach into government, seek to coordi- 
nate the efforts of smaller community organizations.83 For example, the 
Interinstitutional Community Resources Network of Buenos Aires began in the late 
1980s to coordinate work of the state and civil society organizations focused on the 
urban poor. In May 2000 it held the First Latin American Conference of Networks of 
the Third Millenium: Public-Private-Third Sector. Although the network deliberately 
used third sector language to legitimate its grass-roots focus, representatives have felt 
marginalized by the larger networks' access to state and international resources.84 
Conclusion 
The changes in civil society over the last two decades are substantial enough to call 
them a third major transition in recent Latin American history. Democratization and 
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economic reform, as well as international financial institutions and foundations, 
have provided incentives for the transformation of social movements into nongovern- 
mental organizations. Nongovernmental organizations can more consistently interact 
with democratic institutions, take on duties from a retrenched state, and fulfill the 
requirements of external donors. Nonetheless, social movements continue to be an 
important part of civil society, especially in reaction to incomplete democratization 
and the impact of economic transformation. 
The impact of this third transition on the quality of democracy is not direct but 
rather is mediated by the larger representational regimes into which civil society 
organizations fit. The representational regime in Brazil since 1985 has been oriented 
toward more institutionalized alternatives. Both state actors and civil society organi- 
zations have worked to create deliberative spaces and regular opportunities for par- 
ticipation of civil society organizations. Few political systems have such extensive 
and regularized participation by civil society organizations. It is unclear whether the 
resulting representational regime is a cooptive form of democracy that works primar- 
ily to consolidate state control or a deliberative democracy that gives new actors a 
more equitable role in politics. The final representational regime of contemporary 
Brazil is likely to depend on the outcome of intense struggles between state and soci- 
ety over exactly this issue. Both the mobilizing structures of periodically cooperative 
nongovernmental organizations and social movements and the citizenship frame, 
which continues to draw attention to both the sucesses and the gaps in achieving citi- 
zenship, indicate that, at least among civil society organizations, deliberative democ- 
racy is thriving. 
The representational regime in Argentina presents a complex picture, with an 
overall openness compromised by inconsistent state action. The political opportuni- 
ties for Argentine civil society organizations seem to vary by branch of government. 
Executive action (or inaction) is consistent with adversarial and delegative democra- 
cy. Legislative attempts to regulate the formation of civil society organizations may 
indicate cooptive democracy. But the judiciary's recent action supporting the work of 
human rights groups indicates that there is a move towards dialogue between state 
actors and civil society organizations. 85 Mobilizing structures predominantly suggest 
adversarial and delegative democracy. A variety of organizations seek to represent 
their competing goals. In addition, a strong protest sector representing those most 
excluded by new economic models is increasingly active. But some organizations, 
from CELS to the new community networks, are trying to foment horizontal link- 
ages within civil society. Finally, framing efforts are those of delegative democracy; 
issue-specific frames are combined with an antiausterity/state reform frame. 
However, the groups focused on rights-based claims are participating in a delibera- 
tive democracy framing process. 
The usefulness of the concept of representational regimes is apparent in this compar- 
ative study. Comparatively high levels of societal control and institutionalization indi- 
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cate that Brazil has some tendencies towards a deliberative representational regime. 
However, as in Argentina, the amount of state control in organizing society continues to 
be at issue. Argentina's lower levels of societal control and institutionalization indicate 
that, with certain sectoral exceptions, it tends more towards a delegative or adversarial 
regime, pointing to a lack of democratic consolidation within the civil society arena. 
But the very lack of institutionalization of state control may provide some room for 
societal maneuver in the future. Particularly because of the history of state control in 
both countries, institutionalization in and of itself is not an absolute political good but 
must be weighted by its impact on all actors in a democracy. 
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